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Gemeinsames Projekt des Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington und des
Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik mit
Unterstützung des German Marshall Fund of the United States und der
Volkswagen Stiftung
Forschungsinstitut der DGAP: 
Transatlantische Beziehungen und China
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United States auf amerikanischer Seite traf sich im Oktober 2001 eine Arbeitsgruppe in Berlin, die vom For-
schungsinstitut der DGAP und dem Henry L. Stimson Center von Washington gebildet worden war. Anlässlich
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in der vorliegenden Form veröffentlicht wird.
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schungsinstituts,und Dr.Bernhard May,Stellv.Direktor des Forschungsinstituts,geleitet und von Dr.Frank Um-
bach,Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Forschungsinstitut der DGAP, organisiert.
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Jürgen Oberg,Vice President for Asia/Australia, Siemens AG, München
Dr.Wolfgang Pape, Directorate for Asia, DG RELEX-H1, European Commission, Brüssel
Dr.Werner Pfennig, Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft,Arbeitsstelle China und Ostasien, Freie Universität Berlin
Dr. Martin Posth, Präsident,Asien-Pazifik-Forum, Berlin
Dr.Wolfgang Röhr, Leiter des Ostasienreferates,Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin
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About the Report
This report presents the consensus findings and re-
commendations of the “Transatlantic Dialogue on
China,”a year-long exchange between U.S.and Europe-
an experts on China, East Asia, and transatlantic rela-
tions organized by the Henry L. Stimson Center in
Washington, D.C., and the Research Institute of the
German Council on Foreign Relations (Deutsche Ge-
sellschaft für Auswärtige Politik,DGAP) in Berlin,Ger-
many.With the generous support of the German Mars-
hall Fund of the United States and the Volkswagen
Foundation, the two partner institutions organized
and supported two working groups, one based in Was-
hington, DC and the other in Berlin, to explore the ra-
tionale, risks,and benefits of expanding the transatlan-
tic agenda to include consideration of key issues related
to China’s rise in the international system.
The project began in late summer 2001, a time of es-
calating tensions in Sino-American as well as in U.S.-
European relations.Participants proceeded on the pre-
mise that China’s ascendance on the world stage would
signal a major shift in the global political, economic,
and security environment. The project assumed furt-
her that the ability of the United States and Europe to
deal effectively with the challenges associated with Chi-
na’s rise could have far-reaching consequences both for
transatlantic relations and for the effective manage-
ment of China’s global emergence. At the time, the di-
rection of the Bush administration’s China policy ap-
peared hotly contested and the future of Sino-Ameri-
can relations highly uncertain.
The discussions and deliberations of the two wor-
king groups were informed by diverse and rich sources
of expertise and analysis. The members of the two
groups brought to this exchange extensive experience
and knowledge of a broad range of issues related to
China, East Asia, U.S. foreign policy, the EU, and trans-
atlantic relations.Additionally,U.S.and European offi-
cials,experts,and scholars were invited to offer their in-
sights and perspectives on the critical economic,politi-
cal, and security issues associated with China’s
evolution and international rise, as well as the complex
interactions between China, Europe, and the United
States.
The project’s evolution proceeded in unforeseen
ways. Most importantly, the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 changed fundamentally the political
context of the dialogue, if not its central premises. In
the months following the attacks, the attention of se-
nior political leaders in the United States became sin-
gularly focused on the campaign to combat global ter-
rorism, beginning with military action in Afghanistan.
Over time, U.S.-led efforts to thwart new terrorist at-
tacks around the world offered new opportunities for
cooperation between the United States and China. By
fall 2002, Sino-American relations had stabilized and
even improved significantly. Reflecting the new clima-
te in bilateral relations, President Bush’s September
2002 National Security Strategy report welcomed “the
emergence of a strong,peaceful and prosperous China”
and asserted that the U.S. relationship with China “is
an important part of our strategy to promote a stable,
peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.”
Notwithstanding the administration’s apparent
commitment to an “engagement” strategy toward
China, significant new initiatives in Sino-American re-
lations may be unlikely as long as the U.S. administra-
tion is focused on combating terrorism and prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and other
regions. New opportunities for cooperation with
China could emerge, either as part of the global anti-
terrorism campaign or international efforts to address
the uncertain situation on the Korean peninsula. In-
deed,growing concern in early 2003 about North Kore-
a’s actions and intentions have directed attention to the
important role of China in combating proliferation of
weapons destruction in East Asia — a shared interest of
the United States, Europe, and China. Although deve-
lopment of relations with China seems unlikely to be
the highest priority of either the U.S. or European go-
vernments for the foreseeable future, events on the Ko-
rean peninsula underscore the importance of enhan-
ced U.S.-European dialogue on China and regional se-
curity issues before crises erupt.
The members of the U.S. and European working
groups engaged in this project nevertheless believe
strongly in the value of an intensified, sustained, and
focused exchange between the United States,European
national governments, and the European Union on the
future of China and the consequences of its increasin-
gly important international role.Although political le-
aders are necessarily focused on urgent issues of the
day, the time to begin integrating China into a broadly
based transatlantic dialogue is now – before unexpec-
ted developments in China present U.S. and European
policymakers with difficult policy choices and create
new sources of friction in the transatlantic relations-
hip. Indeed, U.S. and European policies are now in clo-
ser alignment than many might have predicted two
years ago, creating an ideal opportunity for reasoned
discussion and dialogue on the critical issues associated
with China’s evolution and rise.
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Executive Summary
China’s rise will pose fundamental challenges to the
United States and Europe, both separately and in their
political relations with one another. Although U.S.and
European leaders for the foreseeable future will remain
focused on more pressing near-term challenges than
China, steps to enhance mutual understanding of
American and European perspectives on China’s futu-
re and international role can and should be taken now.
This report makes the case for an intensified exchange
between U.S.and European China and transatlantic ex-
perts both in and outside of government. It is based on
a year-long exchange among U.S. and European ex-
perts on China and transatlantic relations organized by
the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC and
the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin,
Germany, with the generous support of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States and the Volkswagen
Foundation.
A Changing China: Implications for Transatlantic
Relations
The ability of the United States and Europe to deal
effectively with China’s ascendance will influence deci-
sively the structure of global politics and economic re-
lations,as well the security environment in East Asia, in
this century.
The challenge is all the more daunting because it
comes at a time of fundamental change in Europe and
the transatlantic relationship. The increasing integra-
tion of the member states of the European Union (EU)
and prospective expansion of the EU is creating a Euro-
pe that is more united yet at the same time more com-
plex and fractured. In addition, the transatlantic agen-
da is expanding to include transnational and regional
problems that extend far beyond Europe’s borders.
These developments coincide with a period of increa-
sing friction in U.S.-European relations and a growing
perception on both sides of the Atlantic that coopera-
tion between the United States and Europe has become
less important in a world of fluid coalitions and align-
ments.
U.S. and European Views of China
Although U.S. and European experts largely agree
that China’s rise will have an historic impact on the
international order, there is far less consensus over Chi-
na’s long-term intentions and ambitions. Differences
in perspective and approach are evident not only in the
United States, where divisions over China policy run
through the executive and legislative branches of go-
vernment and both major political parties, but also in
Europe, where national governments and the EU are
involved in shaping various aspects of Europe’s rela-
tions with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
Taiwan, hampering articulation and pursuit of a cohe-
rent and unified China policy.
In general, however, rather than focusing on the po-
tential security threat posed by a rising China, Europe-
ans tend to concentrate on the positive dimensions of
China’s growing importance and international engage-
ment, including the prospect that China may play a res-
ponsible and constructive role in regional and global
institutions and development. Additionally, Europe-
ans also underscore the increasing economic, social
and political strains and stresses on a modernizing
China that could lead to social and political implosion,
which they see as a greater danger to the world than ri-
sing Chinese power. In the European perspective, alt-
hough Europe can do little to affect the geo-political or
military balance in Asia, export of the “European
model” through political dialogue, trade and invest-
ment, and assistance programs, over time can help
build respect for the rule of law in China, introduce and
disseminate democratic principles of accountability,
and strengthen adherence to international norms.
The United States shares these goals and pursues
them as well. But due to its regional and global securi-
ty responsibilities, Washington must be more attentive
to the PRC’s military capabilities and military moder-
nization efforts and assign a higher priority to the secu-
rity of Taiwan. Washington thus tends to place greater
emphasis on affecting China’s external behavior
through alliances and security commitments in the re-
gion and through its own actions and policies.
An Agenda for Dialogue
Despite these disparities in perspective and respon-
sibilities, a sustained and differentiated dialogue on
China would serve two important foreign policy goals
for the United States and Europe. First, although neit-
her the United States nor Europe can determine the
evolution of China, an intensified dialogue on the is-
sues associated with China’s rise could help to facilitate
more effective co-management of the economic,politi-
cal, and strategic consequences of China’s emergence
on the international stage. Second, focused and regular
exchanges on China would allow both partners to iden-
tify differences and potential conflicts in their respecti-
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ve approaches to China, thus avoiding the sudden and
unexpected pursuit of countervailing policies – a “stra-
tegic surprise”that could undermine transatlantic coo-
peration in Asia and perhaps more generally – to the
detriment of the U.S.-European partnership. As the
United States and Europe evolve and change, the politi-
cal will of the United States and Europe to cooperate
will depend increasingly on whether the transatlantic
partnership proves efficacious in tackling a growing
range of new issues and challenges – including change
within China.
To be mutually beneficial, the agenda for dialogue
should encompass five broad issue areas:
Proliferation,Technology Transfer and Export Con-
trols – The United States and Europe have a strongly
shared interest in encouraging China to abide by inter-
national norms and commitments regarding the proli-
feration of weapons of mass destruction and their deli-
very systems. Although a truly coordinated approach
may be premature, expanded dialogue in this area
would help to ensure that neither the United States nor
Europe sends conflicting signals that could be misin-
terpreted in Beijing. Conversely, a lack of transatlantic
coordination could lead to the transfer of sensitive,mi-
litarily relevant technologies or know-how, either to
China or from China to third-parties, with negative re-
percussions for the security of the United States, Euro-
pe, and other friendly and allied nations.
Taiwan and Regional Security –The United States
and Europe have a shared vital interest in promoting
peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and ensuring
that neither the PRC nor Taiwan perceives a transatlan-
tic rift regarding cross-Strait relations, which could
have serious consequences for peace and stability in the
region.While European governments or the EU are un-
likely to undertake bold new initiatives regarding Tai-
wan and cross-Strait relations, further bilateral and
U.S.-EU discussions, both on specific, contentious is-
sues – such as Taiwan’s participation in various inter-
national bodies – and on future possible security cont-
ingencies and responses, could help to avert negative
outcomes and benefit both the United States and Euro-
pe.
WTO Implementation and China’s Economy –Chi-
na’s membership in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and successful integration into the global eco-
nomy on WTO principles is likely to bring sizeable eco-
nomic benefits to the United States as well as to the EU.
A U.S.-EU dialogue on China and WTO would signal a
mutual recognition that China’s meteoric rise on the
global economic scene entails not only certain risks,but
also the promise of significant regional and global be-
nefits. Both partners therefore have much to gain from
working together to assist China in completing the dif-
ficult reforms required by China’s internal economic
situation and the terms of WTO accession.
China’s Internal Evolution: Rule of Law, Human
Rights, and Democratization – Although the United
States and Europe sometimes adopt disparate approa-
ches to promotion of human rights and democracy in
China, they share a common vision for China’s internal
evolution.A particularly promising area for transatlan-
tic cooperation is promotion of the rule of law. Despite
different traditions and systems of law, many legal
principles are held in common,and,more importantly,
the United States and Europe are committed to seeing
that the rule of law becomes more firmly established in
China.
The New Transnational Agenda – A final area for po-
tential U.S.-European and even trilateral cooperation
comprises the issues associated with what has been re-
ferred to as the “dark side of globalization,” including
terrorism, the spread of HIV/AIDS, drug and human
trafficking, and environmental degradation. Intensi-
fied exchanges on this new, transnational agenda could
provide a “win-win”situation for all concerned.
In expanding the transatlantic agenda to include
China, the United States and Europe will face multiple
challenges to effective cooperation, including: (i) poli-
tical divisions within the United States and the EU; (ii)
asymmetries of focus and expertise; (iii) bureaucratic
barriers to the inclusion of China and Asia expertise in
transatlantic exchanges; and (iv) growing tensions and
frictions between the United States and Europe over
environmental and trade-related issues and disparate
approaches to the Middle East and Iraq.
Recommendations for Action
A broad,sustained,and structured transatlantic dia-
logue on China’s evolution would serve U.S. and Euro-
pean interests and foreign policy goals – both with re-
gard to China and to the transatlantic relationship. To
achieve their joint goals,however, the United States and
Europe first must expand their vision of the transatlan-
tic partnership to include an enhanced role for U.S-EU
coordination. Although the European member states
remain the primary players in matters of foreign policy,
a more coherent and unified European policy on China
is desirable and should be encouraged.
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An expanded transatlantic dialogue on China and
related developments in East Asia should be based on
three guiding principles. First, it should focus on con-
crete issues and real experiences. Second, it should
begin with modest expectations. Third, the dialogue
should pursue a “dual-track” approach, encompassing
U.S. engagement of the EU as well as bilateral U.S. ex-
changes with selected European governments.
Building on these general principles of engagement,
several modest steps can and should be taken immedi-
ately to begin expanding the transatlantic agenda to en-
compass the issues posed by China’s rise and emergen-
ce on the international stage:
1. Enhance and expand exchanges among U.S.and Eu-
ropean nongovernmental experts on China, East
Asia, and transatlantic relations by: (i) creating a
comprehensive inventory of China expertise, both
individual and institutional, in Europe and the Uni-
ted States; (ii) cataloguing specific, concrete issues
and urgent problems of common interest to Europe
and the United States; and (iii) enhancing existing
electronic links between U.S. and European China
experts.
2. Expand bilateral and U.S.-EU governmental ex-
changes to include specialists on China and East
Asia. China should be a regular topic of discussion,
rather than the subject of periodic focus when pres-
sing issues arise or a crisis threatens. Discussions
should utilize the primary channels of transatlantic
dialogue, including bilateral U.S. exchanges with the
larger European countries and the U.S.-EU dialo-
gue. Initially, steps should be taken to: (i) organize a
regular exchange between government analysts of
China and transatlantic affairs; and (ii) initiate regu-
lar exchanges on China between the research institu-
tes associated with national defense universities in
Europe and the United States.
3. Undertake analyses of concrete issues that are on the
horizon and likely to prove contentious. Intensified
inter-governmental and “track-two” exchanges on
China should seek to identify the “over-the-horizon”
issues on which U.S. and European approaches and
thinking appear likely to diverge. Issues meriting
more extensive analysis in the near-term include: the
migration of manufacturing and R&D capability to
China; WTO implementation; and crisis scenarios
involving instability in China.
For the foreseeable future, the transatlantic agenda
will be dominated by the war against terrorism, the un-
certain situation in Iraq, and conflicts in the Middle
East and South Asia. Yet, while China at present offers
no comparable flashpoints, as the uncertain situation
on the Korean peninsula demonstrates, the potential
for conflict in the region and for transatlantic disputes
over issues related to China remains. The U.S. and EU
would therefore both benefit from efforts to enhance
mutual understanding of their respective perspectives
on China and to anticipate potential problems and
even crises before they arise.
Though modest in scope and ambition, the steps
outlined above could help to begin transforming the
structure and content of the transatlantic dialogue to
meet the most important challenges of the coming de-
cades. In the final analysis, however, the precise form of
cooperation is less important than the existence of po-
litical will on both sides of the Atlantic to work beyond
Europe to manage the complex and myriad challenges
of a rapidly changing world.
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Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 ushered
in a period of profound change in global politics, reve-
aling new threats and creating fresh opportunities for
international cooperation.The priorities and preoccu-
pations of U.S. leaders and the American public, in par-
ticular, shifted dramatically in the ensuing months.The
Bush administration’s attention is now focused prima-
rily on the global campaign against terrorism and eff-
orts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, North Korea, and elsewhere. Sino-
American relations, though of growing importance to
the administration, have necessarily been eclipsed by
these more pressing issues. While the impact of Sep-
tember 11 has been less dramatic in Europe and Asia,
the reorientation of U.S. policy has had worldwide re-
percussions, prompting a strategic realignment bet-
ween Russia and the West and concerted cooperation
to thwart future terrorist attacks.
China’s rise – and the U.S.and European response to
the challenges and opportunities it entails – neverthe-
less remain of central importance to the future politi-
cal, economic, and security environment of the 21st
century. Just as the United States’ ascendance at the
close of the nineteenth century had global consequen-
ces, the effects of China’s emergence on the world stage
in the coming decades will ripple throughout East Asia
and the international system. The ability of the United
States and Europe to deal effectively with ascending po-
wers—above all,China—could influence decisively the
structure of global politics and economic relations, as
well the security environment in East Asia, in this cen-
tury.
The challenges associated with managing this global
transformation are all the more daunting because they
come at a time of fundamental change in Europe and
the transatlantic relationship. With the increasing eco-
nomic, political, and security integration of the mem-
ber states of the European Union  (EU) and expansion
of the EU’s borders as agreed at the 2002 Copenhagen
summit, the United States will be faced with a Europe
that is more united, yet more complex and fractured.
The transatlantic relationship is evolving as well. Re-
flecting the geopolitical changes of the least decade, the
U.S.-European agenda is expanding to include potenti-
ally divisive transnational and regional issues beyond
Europe’s borders. Iraq has proven to be one such issue;
China could prove to be another. These developments
coincide with a period of increasing friction in U.S.-
European relations and a growing perception that coo-
peration between the United States and Europe has be-
come less important in a world of fluid coalitions and
alignments.Whether the transatlantic partnership will
prove equal to these challenges depends, in part, on the
ability and willingness of both partners to adapt to
changes in the world and in their respective positions
and to redefine the parameters and expectations of
their mutual cooperation.
U.S. and European leaders for the foreseeable future
will remain focused on more pressing near-term chal-
lenges than China.Steps to enhance mutual understan-
ding of American and European perspectives on Chi-
na’s future and international role nevertheless can and
should be taken now. In the coming decades, the China
policy of the United States could change in response to
developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and Taiwan, the progress of the campaign against glo-
bal terrorism, and domestic political debates over the
direction of Sino-American relations. The EU’s aspira-
tions to assume a more important role in international
affairs and its growing trade and financial links to
China also will force European governments and the
EU to pay more attention to challenges posed by this
emerging great power. Developments in China as well
could present difficult policy choices for both Europe-
an and American policymakers. Sustained and focused
exchanges on U.S. and European approaches to China,
before political, social or economic instability occurs,
could help to reduce the risks of dangerous divisions
emerging between the United States and Europe in a
time of crisis. On a more positive note, a sustained and
focused dialogue on China over time could facilitate
joint and cooperative management of the strategic re-
lationship with the most important emerging power in
the 21st century.
The time to build the foundation for such a dialogue
is now. The dialogue should engage U.S. and European
experts on China as well as those knowledgeable about
Europe, the United States, and transatlantic relations.
On the European side, the dialogue must necessarily
engage both national governments in Europe as well as
the European Union, with the appropriate mix deter-
mined by the issues involved, the evolving balance of
influence over foreign and security policy between Eu-
ropean governments and EU institutions, and the de-
velopment of European “policy-shaping” mecha-
nisms.1 For the foreseeable future, bilateral exchanges
between the United States and select European govern-
1 This report thus uses the term “Europe” to reflect the complex
mix of responsibilities and competencies over political, econo-
mic, foreign, and security affairs between the European Union
and the national governments of the member states. Where one
or the other has clear responsibility, a distinction is drawn.
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ments will continue to be important on foreign policy
and security issues related to Taiwan and the People’s
Republic of China; at the same time, the United States
would benefit from a more coherent and unified Euro-
pean policy on China and should encourage such an
evolution through regular, structured exchanges with
the European Union, beginning with those issues on
which the EU has clear competency.
Exchanges should encompass discussion of broad
principles as well as concrete steps. Initially, the dialo-
gue should aim to achieve modest, concrete gains, in-
cluding a better understanding of U.S. and European
experiences with,and analyses of,China; and knowled-
ge of the domestic drivers of U.S.and European policies
as well as the role of the EU versus national govern-
ments in shaping European approaches to China and
East Asia. Over time, such enhanced transatlantic ex-
changes should ensure that U.S. and European China
policies are complementary, at a minimum, and coor-
dinated, if at all possible.
The proposed expansion of the transatlantic agenda
to include discussion of China’s future may encounter
skepticism on both sides of the Atlantic, given the dis-
parity of interest and responsibilities in East Asia and
the preponderance of other issues on both U.S and Eu-
ropean agendas. Such skepticism, though understan-
dable, is nevertheless shortsighted and overlooks the
substantial benefits—as well as risks—that may be in-
curred depending on the ability of the United States
and Europe to integrate new issues and agendas into
the transatlantic partnership.
This report makes the case for an intensified exchan-
ge between U.S. and European China analysts and
transatlantic experts both in and outside of govern-
ment. It is based on a year-long exchange among U.S.
and European experts on China and transatlantic rela-
tions organized by the Henry L. Stimson Center in
Washington, DC and the German Council on Foreign
Relations in Berlin, Germany, with the generous sup-
port of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
and the Volkswagen Foundation.Over the course of the
year, participants in this nongovernmental “Transat-
lantic Dialogue on China”explored and discussed U.S.
and European perspectives on a range of key issues re-
lated to China’s emergence as a global power, including
trade, investment, and financial relations; human
rights and democracy; Taiwan and cross-Strait rela-
tions; and the proliferation of weapons of mass des-
truction and their delivery capabilities and other secu-
rity challenges. The report begins with a brief overview
of the changing political context of relations among the
United States, Europe, and China and the impact of
these changes on American and European perceptions
of China. The report then outlines an agenda for a sus-
tained, differentiated transatlantic dialogue on China
and proposes modest steps to begin building the foun-
dation for effective U.S-European management of the
effects of an emergent China as a global power in the
21st century.
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A Changing China: Implications for
Transatlantic Relations
China’s internal evolution and increasing interna-
tional engagement over the coming decades will have a
profound impact on global and regional politics, eco-
nomics, and security. For more than a decade, China
has experienced an extraordinary rate of economic
growth and expansion of its foreign trade and has been
the major beneficiary of foreign direct investment
among developing countries. Economic ties between
China and the United States and between China and
EU countries have expanded significantly since 
China’s opening to the world over two decades ago,
with dramatic increases achieved in the 1990s alone. In
recent years, the United States and the European Union
have been among China’s top investors and most im-
portant trading partners.Anticipating significant busi-
ness opportunities with the opening of the Chinese
market, both the EU and United States signed agree-
ments with China that facilitated its entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO).2 On the diplomatic
front,China’s participation in global and regional mul-
tilateral institutions over the last twenty years has broa-
dened and deepened,enhancing Beijing’s clout in orga-
nizations as disparate as the UN Security Council, the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization, and
the ASEAN Regional Forum. In the security realm,
modernization of China’s military capabilities procee-
ded at a slow but steady pace from 1979 through the
mid-1990s, followed by double-digit annual increases
in the public defense budget to raise the level of milita-
ry capabilities from a relatively low and outdated base.
Significant challenges still lie ahead. China is cur-
rently engaged in a generational transition in leaders-
hip. Additionally, the country is facing intensifying
labor unrest and potential social instability as further
economic reforms are implemented in response to fun-
damental internal economic exigencies, which could
lead to a significant increase in unemployment and
other economic dislocations. The Chinese leadership
and government also face—and sometimes foster—a
burgeoning nationalism that draws strength from a
sense of growing self-confidence about China’s power
and suspicions about U.S. intentions toward China. Fi-
nally, a crisis over the unresolved Taiwan issue could
lead to a major conflict with the United States and shar-
ply set back the PRC’s modernization efforts.
In the global management of China’s ascendance,
special responsibilities will fall on the United States and
its key partners, including the states of Europe and, in-
creasingly, the European Union. Despite the current
mood of disagreements and mutual tensions, the Uni-
ted States and Europe remain partners of choice and
necessity when it comes to effective management of
proliferation, global terrorism, immigration, and a
lengthening laundry list of other transnational issues.
Moreover, while the transatlantic gap in military capa-
bilities may be widening, the economic integration of
the European and American economies continues
apace,creating mutual dependencies for good or ill and
lending the United States and Europe a preponderant
voice in trade, financial and other global economic is-
sues.
With regard to China, the United States and Europe
have a common interest in ensuring that the dangers of
incompatible or dissonant approaches are averted and
the benefits of complementary or even coordinated ac-
tion secured.Unless potential differences in the US and
European approaches to China are identified and, if
possible, resolved, the United States and its European
partners may find themselves pursuing competitive or
incompatible policies on nonproliferation, trade, tech-
nology transfer,and global financial and economic ma-
nagement. The risk that China could exploit these
transatlantic differences to its advantage and the mutu-
al detriment of the United States and Europe would
also grow. Alternatively, through expanded dialogue
and cooperation, both may reap significant benefits, as
demonstrated by the U.S. and European negotiations
with Beijing on China’s accession to the WTO. In this
instance,U.S.and European officials engaged in regular
consultations and exchanges that resulted in effective
“co-management” of the negotiations and China’s
entry into the organization—an important objective
for governments on both sides of the Atlantic and for
China as well.
Effective co-management on a broader agenda will
be not be easy to achieve, however, for China is not the
only rising power. Over the last decade, the 15 member
2 For an overview of the EU-China agreement on WTO see,“High-
lights of the EU-China Agreement on WTO,” website of the Eu-
ropean Commission Delegation in China,http:www.edc.org.cn/
WTO/hio.htm; and Frances Williams, “Highlights of China’s
WTO Entry Terms,”Financial Times,17 September 2001.For the
text of the final agreement with China, see http://www.uschi-
na.org/public/wto/#accession. For a comprehensive exposition
of the U.S.-China agreement on WTO entry, see “The Bilateral
Agreement and the United States,” in the special issue of the
China Business Review, January-February 2000,available online
at http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/uscbc/wtobilat.html. A
summary is also available on the website of the U.S.Trade Repre-
sentative,“China’s Accession to the WTO,”http://www.ustr.gov/
regions/china-hk-mongolia-taiwan/accession.shtml.
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states of the European Union have made far-reaching
progress in deepening and strengthening their politi-
cal and economic integration. Although European
military capabilities continue to lag behind those of
the United States, on global and financial matters, the
European Union now commands significant influen-
ce. In foreign and security policy, the EU member sta-
tes retain important prerogatives, but even in this area
of “core” national competence, the EU member states
are working to develop a Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP) that could transform Europe into a
more active and perhaps powerful player in interna-
tional affairs.
The transformation of Europe will necessitate
changes in transatlantic relations as well. While bila-
teral relations between the United States and Europe-
an states remain paramount, the United States and
European Union have taken steps to strengthen the
U.S.-EU partnership, both through the “Transatlan-
tic Declaration on EU/US Relations” of 1990 and the
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) of 1995. For the fo-
reseeable future, the transatlantic relationship will
continue to encompass both bilateral exchanges and
U.S. cooperation with NATO and the EU, as determi-
ned by the issue. As the structure of transatlantic re-
lations and agenda for cooperation evolve, the trans-
atlantic relationship may come to be defined far less
by what the United States does for Europe—as during
the Cold War—and far more by what the two partners
do together in distant parts of the world and on issues
that may have very little to do with the traditional
agenda of U.S.-European relations.
Though now considered a lower priority, China in
many ways is emblematic of the new transatlantic
agenda. The nature and limits of U.S.-European co-
operation in East Asia or with regard to China are as
yet undetermined.A critical U.S. view would hold that
Europe in the end may continue to act as a “free rider,”
content to reap the economic benefits of increased
trade with and investment in China, but unwilling to
act to check Chinese behavior that falls outside accep-
ted international norms, particularly on prolifera-
tion, human rights, and Taiwan. Others suggest that a
“division of labor”—whether it is agreed or emerges
from practice—between the United States and Euro-
pe is inevitable, given the disparity in U.S. and Euro-
pean capabilities, particularly in the military sphere.
Alternatively, the United States and Europe may evol-
ve more limited forms of cooperation that result in
the pursuit of compatible, or possibly even comple-
mentary, approaches and strategies on particular is-
sues. Determination of both the possibilities and li-
mits of U.S.-European cooperation on China must
begin with an increased understanding of U.S., Euro-
pean, and EU interests, priorities, goals, and strate-
gies, both more generally and with regard to China
and East Asia specifically.
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U.S. and European Views of China
A U.S.-European conflict over approaches to China
is not inevitable—no more than is a U.S-China conflict
foreordained.Although countervailing minority views
exist, the United States and Europe generally share a
desire to see China evolve into a stable and prosperous
country that is integrated into the world economy and
a responsible member of the international community.
Further, neither the United States nor Europe wants a
conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which could cause signifi-
cant damage to U.S regional interests and disrupt Euro-
pe’s growing economic ties to the region. In seeking to
manage the implications of China’s evolution, both
U.S. and European officials and analysts are aware of
the social, economic, and political challenges facing
China, which can create conflicts among Chinese lea-
ders and bureaucracies and lead to contradictory beha-
viors and actions.
U.S. and European objectives in their respective
relations with China reflect shared values and vision
as well. The Bush administration has said that the
United States and China have common interests
“that are best served by a productive—and positi-
ve—relationship.” At the same time, U.S. officials
underscore key differences with Beijing over Taiwan,
human rights and religious freedom, arms sales
around the world, and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and their delivery systems.3 Re-
flecting the consensus perspective of European sta-
tes, the EU Commission’s 1995 Communication on a
“comprehensive partnership with China” outlines a
strategy to achieve China’s rapid and full integration
into the international community and its “transition
to an open society based upon the rule of law.” Euro-
pean goals are to be achieved through engagement of
China in the international community, support for
the transition to an open society based on the rule of
law and respect for human rights, and further inte-
gration of China into the world economy and tra-
ding system as well as continuing economic and so-
cial reform.4
While possessing similar visions for China’s future,
Europe and the United States sometimes adopt diffe-
rent strategies or assign varying priorities in pursuit of
their common aim. The fissures over China policy fall
not only between but within Europe and the United
States.
Despite the avowed EU aim of “partnership with
China,”a “European”China policy is not generally per-
ceived to exist. There is little debate about China and
China policy among opinion leaders,“policy-shapers,”
or the broader public.And while some of the larger Eu-
ropean states have historical ties to Asia, many smaller
European countries have little experience in dealing
with China beyond trade and development issues. Eu-
ropean governments, not surprisingly, do not always
agree on the best approach to China on specific issues.
Implementation of China policy is also dispersed, with
the EU assuming significant responsibility for manage-
ment of external trade relations with the PRC and Tai-
wan, and individual member states retaining power on
other issues of foreign policy. Although the European
Union aspires to play a greater role in shaping foreign
and security policy, China has not been at the focus of
this process to date. In a crisis situation, for example,
political instability in the PRC or a conflict over Tai-
wan, many observers predict that the balance of in-
fluence would shift decisively to national governments,
particularly in the absence of an EU-wide consensus on
the role of the EU in security and military affairs. As a
consequence of these asymmetries of interest, know-
ledge, and power, European states have had difficulty
developing and implementing a coherent policy in sup-
port of their consensual vision for China.
Improved coordination of European approaches to
China nevertheless should be possible. Since China
3 For comments on U.S. China policy, see the address of Ambassa-
dor Richard N. Haas, Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Depart-
ment of State,“China and the Future of U.S.-China Relations, to
the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations’ Annual Mee-
ting, 5 December 2002, New York,
http://www.ncuscr.org/haass%20speech.htm. See also the testi-
mony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs James A. Kelly on “ The Future of U.S.-China Relations” be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC, 1 May 2001,
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2001/2697pf.htm; and James
A. Kelly,Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs, “President Bush’s Trip to Asia: Outlook and Policy Pro-
spects,”remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Washington, DC 18 March 2002,
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2002/8820pf.htm.
4 “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China,”website of
the External Relations Directorate General of the European
Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/
china/com_98/index.htm. The Commission Communication
outlining a strategy toward China was adopted in 1995 and re-
viewed in 1998 and reviewed in 2001. For an evaluation of the
strategy’s implementation, see the Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,“EU
Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communi-
cation and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy,”Brussels,
15 May 2001.
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does not appear to be a high priority on the foreign po-
licy agenda of European governments, it may be easier
for EU governments to agree on routine matters of po-
licy, particularly when supported by the EU’s “policy-
shaping” processes and mechanisms, which facilitate
regular exchange of information among European fo-
reign ministries. Moreover, effective cooperation
among European governments has already been achie-
ved on a number of practical issues related to China,
including organized crime and illegal immigration.
European perceptions of China, moreover, are based
on several shared assumptions.In general,rather than fo-
cusing on the potential security threat posed by a rising
China, Europeans tend to concentrate on the positive di-
mensions of China’s growing importance and internatio-
nal engagement, including the prospect that China may
play a responsible and constructive role in regional and
global institutions and development. Additionally,Euro-
peans also underscore the increasing economic,social and
political strains and stresses on a modernizing China that
could lead to social and political implosion,which they see
as a greater danger to the world than rising Chinese power.
Europe’s comparative advantage, in this view, lies in the
projection of Europe’s significant “soft power”and export
of the “European model”through political dialogue,trade
and investment,and assistance programs,which over time
can help build respect for the rule of law in China, intro-
duce and disseminate democratic principles of accounta-
bility, and strengthen adherence to international norms.
In a very real sense,Europeans regard the difficult process
of strengthening and expanding the EU as Europe’s most
important contribution,not only to the peace and securi-
ty of Europe, but to that of other regions and countries
that might benefit from EU engagement or assistance. In
the European perspective, although European govern-
ments and the EU can do little to affect the geo-political or
military balance in Asia and prefer to rely on diplomacy,
dialogue and cooperative programs,the EU’s approach to
China is nonetheless “strategic”in nature,because it seeks
to effect long-term change in China and Chinese beha-
vior.
While the United States shares these goals and pursues
them as well, given its regional and global strategic res-
ponsibilities, the United States must be more attentive to
China’s military capabilities and modernization efforts
and assign a higher priority to the security of Taiwan.Was-
hington thus tends to place greater emphasis on altering
China’s external behavior through alliances and security
commitments in the region and through its own actions
and policies. Many U.S. experts perceive the European
emphasis on economic relations with China as a response
to domestic commercial and other economic pressures,
while others are less sanguine about the prospects for ef-
fecting change in China’s external behavior through pro-
grams targeted at achieving internal reform. U.S. experts
urge their European counterparts to be more attentive
both to the limits of“soft power”in guaranteeing stability
and security in the region and to the strategic implications
of China’s growing economic importance and military ca-
pabilities, which the United States, by virtue of its global
and regional responsibilities, cannot ignore. Concern
about the strategic ramifications of China’s rise in the
international system is broadly shared among U.S. ex-
perts,although no consensus exists over the most effective
and appropriate policy response. While a minority per-
spective favors “containment”of the PRC,others argue for
continued engagement,coupled with a strong U.S.milita-
ry presence and alliance structure in the Western Pacific as
a “hedge”against the possibility that China will emerge as
a strong and hostile nation.
U.S.-European disparities in perspective also reflect the
impact of differing historical experience and domestic po-
litics. The United States has a long history of relations with
China,and China policy today continues to be the source
of intense political debate and divisions—within and bet-
ween the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment and the major political parties.The democratization
of Taiwan has intensified already strong concerns for safe-
guarding Taiwan’s security and the well-being of its peo-
ple, particularly in the U.S. Congress—support that is
often independent of one’s respective view on whether
China must be “contained”or “engaged.” In contrast,with
the exception of a handful of countries, the Europeans
have no comparable historical experience with China.
Europe’s experience also puts it at odds with an in-
fluential minority view in the United States that portrays
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China as a rising threat to U.S.interests and long-term pre-
sence in East Asia—beginning with Taiwan. Some repre-
sentatives of this perspective would rather “contain”than
engage the PRC through the imposition of stringent con-
trols on trade and technology transfer, the maintenance
of a large U.S.military presence in the region,and enhan-
ced military ties with Taiwan. Adherents to this view are
increasingly focused on Taiwan as the central concern of
U.S. China policy. This perspective appears to be largely
absent in Europe.Europeans may acknowledge that Euro-
pe has a strong interest in Taiwan’s security and in main-
taining stability in East Asia, but see the United States as
principally responsible for safeguarding this “common
good.”As a consequence,there are no European advocates
of a European military force in the region,although some
analysts might argue for greater support of U.S.policy on
Taiwan.
An Agenda for Dialogue
Despite the disparities in perspective and responsi-
bilities, a sustained and differentiated dialogue on
China would serve two important foreign policy goals
for the United States and Europe. First, although neit-
her the United States nor Europe can determine the
evolution of China, an intensified dialogue on the is-
sues associated with China’s rise could help to facilitate
more effective co-management of the economic,politi-
cal, and strategic consequences of China’s emergence
on the international stage. Second, focused and regular
exchanges on China would allow both partners to iden-
tify differences and potential conflicts in their respecti-
ve approaches to China, thus avoiding the sudden and
unexpected pursuit of countervailing policies—a “stra-
tegic surprise”that could undermine transatlantic coo-
peration in Asia and perhaps more generally—to the
detriment of the U.S.-European partnership. As the
United States and Europe evolve and change, the politi-
cal will of the United States and Europe to cooperate
will depend increasingly on whether the transatlantic
partnership proves efficacious in tackling a growing
range of new issues and challenges—including change
within China.
To be mutually beneficial, the agenda for an enhan-
ced transatlantic dialogue should focus on a range of
concrete issues related to China’s evolution and reflect
U.S.and European priorities, interests, and responsibi-
lities in the region. In some instances, bilateral exchan-
ges will be most appropriate and effective; for other is-
sues, an intensified U.S.-EU dialogue should be pur-
sued. In each case, the issue should determine the
institutional framework for dialogue. Given the asym-
metries noted above, a comprehensive agenda is advi-
sable to avoid foundering on any particular issue and to
ensure that both parties’ interests are addressed. In ge-
neral,U.S.policymakers and experts can be expected to
assign a higher priority to discussions that relate to core
security problems in East Asia and globally, including
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery capabilities and the security and status of
Taiwan, as well as to trade issues and the human rights
situation in the PRC. European priorities would inclu-
de China’s economic and internal political evolution,
as well as important transnational challenges on which
the U.S., Europe, and China could cooperate to mutual
benefit. Within this broad agenda, outlined below, the
prospects for cooperation are likely to vary according
to the issue’s salience, impact on national interest, and
coincidence of objectives.
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Proliferation, Technology Transfer, and Export
Controls 
Although they have tended to approach the problem
differently, the United States and Europe have strong
shared interests in encouraging China to abide by inter-
national norms and commitments regarding the proli-
feration of weapons of mass destruction and their deli-
very systems, particularly to regions of conflict such as
the Middle East and South Asia. In general, European
states are inclined to focus on enhancing China’s parti-
cipation in global nonproliferation treaties and regi-
mes. Although the United States has expended consid-
erable effort in persuading China to join international
nonproliferation regimes, it has tended to advocate and
be capable of undertaking more rigorous monitoring
of China’s compliance with its nonproliferation obli-
gations. Despite this disparity of focus, however, both
U.S. and European officials over the last decade have
noted a marked change in Chinese attitudes regarding
nonproliferation and arms control that provides a
foundation for future cooperation.
While the Chinese initially tended to view nonproli-
feration regimes as arrangements to restrict trade by
Chinese exporters, Chinese officials have come to see
participation in global nonproliferation regimes and
processes as beneficial to Chinese interests and objecti-
ves. China’s performance on nonproliferation and the
control of sensitive technologies is generally believed
to have improved over the last decade and Beijing con-
tinues to take steps to address U.S and Western con-
cerns. For example, following repeated delays, Beijing
in August 2002 issued new regulations governing the
export of missile technology as well as new regulations
on the export of chemical weapons precursors and bio-
logical agent related items. Additionally, the Regula-
tions on Control of Military Products’Export have also
been amended.5 These measures should bring Chinese
regulations and export control lists into alignment with
multilateral export control regimes. The new regula-
tions were welcomed by U.S. officials, although con-
cerns remain about possible loopholes.6 A key question
for both Europeans and the U.S. government is whet-
her such activities occur with or without the knowled-
ge and support of the central government and, in any
event, what the government is doing to clamp down on
such behavior.
Despite signs of a growing and genuine commit-
ment to nonproliferation, a reversal or at least a hiatus
in China’s adherence to international norms and bila-
teral commitments cannot be excluded. Internal tur-
moil,persistent interagency differences,changes in U.S.
policy, or developments in China’s relations with other
nuclear powers could undermine Chinese willingness
to participate constructively in international nonproli-
feration and export control arrangements and the wil-
lingness of the government to enforce its non-prolife-
ration commitments internally.
Given the dangers associated with the proliferation
of destructive technologies to hostile states or terrorist
groups, an intensified transatlantic dialogue on China
and proliferation should be a high priority.Bilateral ex-
changes will continue to be important to discuss the
implications of military exports to the region, because
regulation of defense-related trade remains under the
purview of European governments. In addition, a U.S.
dialogue with EU officials will be necessary to address
the transfer of sensitive dual-use technologies, since the
EU is endeavoring to harmonize national regulations
governing some such items of international commer-
ce.7
The aim of this enhanced engagement should be to
ensure that U.S.and European approaches to China re-
main parallel or complementary and are not adversely
affected by differences in principle between the Bush
administration and many European governments over
the value of nonproliferation and arms control treaties
and regimes. Agreement between the United States and
Europe on a unified response to China’s proliferation
behavior, such as the imposition of sanctions, appears
unlikely; the United States and European governments
nevertheless might find alternative modes of coopera-
tion to discourage China’s proliferation activities. For
example, European governments, particularly those
with a long history of bilateral discussions with the
United States on nonproliferation, could be helpful in
encouraging China to abide by Beijing’s bilateral agree-
ments with the United States. Although a truly coordi-
nated approach may be premature, expanded dialogue
in this area would help to ensure that neither the United
States nor Europe sends conflicting signals that could
be misinterpreted in Beijing. The potential for coope-
ration in this area could increase over time,as the Euro-
pean states achieve further advances in developing a
5 See Elisabeth Rosenthal,“China Issue Rules on Export of Missile
Gear,” New York Times, 26 August 2002; and “Chinese Export
Controls and Jiang Zemin’s Visit to the United States,”Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/china/chiexp/index.htm.
6 See the testimony by Assistant Secretary of State John S.Wolf be-
fore the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Subcommittee
on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, 6
June 2002, http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/10929.htm.
7 U.S. engagement of the EU is necessary, since export controls on
some such items fall under the competence of the European
Community.
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more unified or even common approach to nonprolife-
ration. Conversely, a lack of transatlantic coordination
could lead to the transfer of sensitive, military-related
technologies or know-how, either to China or from
China to third parties, with negative repercussions for
the security of the United States, Europe, and other
friendly and allied nations.
Taiwan and Regional Security
Differences in strategic perspective, commitment,
and national interests often lead the United States and
Europe to adopt different strategies on Taiwan and
cross-Strait relations. Meaningful cooperation on Tai-
wan therefore could be difficult to achieve. Both the
United States and Europe nevertheless have a shared in-
terest in promoting peaceful resolution of cross-Strait
issues and ensuring that neither the PRC nor Taiwan
perceives a transatlantic rift on this critical issue, with
serious consequences for peace and stability in the re-
gion. Beyond cross-Strait relations, the United States
and Europe could also benefit from enhanced discus-
sion of those regional security issues in which China
could play a role, such as the evolution of the Korean
peninsula.
Although the United States and Europe are commit-
ted in one form or another to “one China”and a peace-
ful resolution of the cross-Strait conflict, only the Uni-
ted States has undertaken specific security obligations
to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act.While Euro-
pean governments are broadly committed to a com-
mon approach on Taiwan’s future, the PRC remains the
principal focus of European engagement in East Asia.
European governments, pointing to their own history,
are encouraged by growing economic integration bet-
ween the Mainland and Taiwan and argue that, in the
long term, economic interdependence will facilitate a
peaceful political resolution of the current conflict.
Most American specialists agree, and U.S. policy re-
mains supportive of cross-Strait economic ties. Some
U.S. observers nevertheless are notably skeptical that
cross-Strait economic integration will either dampen
rising nationalism on the Mainland—and Taiwan—or
necessarily make the PRC a more enticing or attractive
place in the eyes of many Taiwanese. Many U.S. experts
are also critical of what they perceive as weak European
support for Taiwan and an unwillingness to bolster a
rhetorical commitment to peaceful resolution of the
PRC-Taiwan conflict with meaningful actions, either
regarding Taiwan-specific issues or in Europeans’ dia-
logue with Beijing. This perspective is echoed by a mi-
nority of European experts, who argue for inclusion of
core military and security issues on the European agen-
da for a common policy toward Asia.
Though such a contingency at present may appear
remote to some observers, the risks and potentially cat-
astrophic consequences of a conflict in the Taiwan
Strait argue strongly for an intensified exchange on
these differences. Although their stakes are different, if
the United States were to engage in a military conflict
with the PRC over Taiwan or,even short of war, to apply
sanctions against the Mainland in response to a PRC
attack on or threat to Taiwan, European states would
come under severe pressure to follow suit.While Euro-
pean governments or the EU are unlikely to undertake
bold new initiatives regarding Taiwan and cross-Strait
relations, an enhanced transatlantic dialogue on speci-
fic, contentious issues – such as Taiwan’s participation
in various international bodies – and on future possible
security contingencies and responses, could help to
avert such negative outcomes and thus benefit both the
United States and Europe. Given the political sensitivi-
ties involved, bilateral channels may be more helpful in
enhancing understanding of U.S.and European appro-
aches to Taiwan, perhaps supplemented by intensified
exchanges with the European Union regarding econo-
mic issues.
The increasingly uncertain future of the Korean pe-
ninsula and China’s role in mitigating a potential crisis
over North Korea’s resumed nuclear weapons program
should also be the subject of intensified dialogue bet-
ween the United States and European national govern-
ments. The European Union, which in May 2001 sent a
delegation to Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss, among
other issues, relations between the two Korean states
and North Korea’s missile program and nonprolifera-
tion, may also have a role to play in such a dialogue.8
WTO Implementation and China’s Economy
Despite the solid track record of U.S.-European coo-
peration on China’s accession to the World Trade Orga-
nization, multiplying transatlantic trade frictions and
U.S.-European economic competition both globally
and in the China market could hinder continued coo-
peration between the United States and Europe in en-
suring the effective implementation of China’s WTO
commitments. The continuing integration of China
8 The European Union is also a member of the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On the EU overtu-
re to North Korea, see Stockholm European Council: Presidency
Conclusions, Press Release, Stockholm, 24 March 2001
(100/1/01), http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main.cfm?LANG=1.
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into the world economy nevertheless remains an im-
portant shared objective for the United States and Eu-
rope. China’s membership in the WTO and successful
integration into the global economy on WTO princi-
ples is likely to bring sizeable economic benefits to the
United States as well as to the EU. A U.S.-EU dialogue
on China and WTO would signal a mutual recognition
that China’s meteoric rise on the global economic scene
entails not only certain risks, but also the promise of
significant regional and global benefits. Both partners
therefore have much to gain from working together to
assist China in completing the difficult reforms requi-
red by China’s internal economic situation and under
the terms of WTO accession.
The successful negotiation of China’s entry into the
WTO was only the start of a protracted and difficult
process. Although China’s present leadership appears
fully committed to participation in the WTO, U.S. and
European trade officials also caution that it will take
time for China to make the necessary adjustments to
implement the WTO agreements. In the meantime,
China appears willing and, indeed, eager to receive ad-
ditional technical assistance in WTO implementation,
which both the EU and U.S. have an interest in exten-
ding and indeed have already begun to provide. At the
same time, problems with implementation will inevit-
ably arise, in turn generating domestic political pressu-
res within Europe and the United States to apply safe-
guards and anti-dumping provisions. Although Euro-
pean and U.S. officials appear to share a common
understanding that the WTO dispute mechanisms
should not be applied to every dispute, the commit-
ment to finding a constructive solution under these cir-
cumstances could be difficult to sustain. Transatlantic
disputes could also arise because of underlying philo-
sophical differences over the application of free trade
principles in China.
Continued U.S.-European cooperation on China
and WTO implementation, perhaps beginning with
enhanced exchanges on technical assistance,could pro-
vide a foundation for broader exchanges on China’s
growing integration into the international economy.
Given increasing concern about proliferation, the issue
of technology transfer to China is bound to feature
more prominently on the U.S. agenda. U.S.-European
disputes over standards, agriculture, and biotechnolo-
gy could be potentially divisive as well, as shown by re-
cent strenuous U.S efforts to prevent China from adop-
ting limits on imports of GMO foods and feed,as advo-
cated by the EU. Additionally, the rapid migration of
manufacturing capability and research and develop-
ment capacity to China will pose additional challenges
that could divide the United States and Europe.Finally,
the inevitably difficult U.S.-EU negotiations in the
Doha Round could affect the development of coopera-
tion toward China, as each attempts to lobby this new
member.
As with other issues, an intensified transatlantic ex-
change on China’s evolving economy and the PRC’s in-
tegration into the WTO should involve multiple U.S.-
European channels. The EU will continue to play a pi-
votal role in ensuring that China fulfills its
international commitments related to WTO accession.
On the other hand, European governments do not al-
ways pursue common aims on trade and economic is-
sues,and bilateral talks thus will continue to be helpful.
China’s internal evolution: rule of law, human
rights, and democratization 
Despite their generally common vision of China’s
desired future internal evolution, views differ within
the United States and among European governments
over the best means of promoting human rights and
democracy in China. Although Europeans believe
strongly in universal human rights principles, many
dispute the efficacy of the more public U.S. approach.
In general, European governments have tended to sup-
port the official EU position, which supports an inten-
sive EU-China human rights dialogue “without pre-
conditions” and advocates specific cooperation pro-
jects as “at present the most appropriate means of
contributing to human rights in China.”9 In this per-
spective, dialogue and further progress toward econo-
mic development are expected to improve China’s
compliance with internationally accepted standards of
human rights and to help build a long-term constructi-
ve relationship with China. The United States, in con-
trast, is apt to couple bilateral exchanges on human
rights with more frequent public statements condem-
ning Chinese abuses of broadly accepted standards of
human rights and religious freedom.This is due in part
to strong domestic political pressures,particularly wit-
hin the U.S. Congress, but also reflects a unique history
and diplomatic approach. These differences in tactics,
though perhaps unbridgeable, nevertheless warrant
continued discussion.U.S.-European exchanges on the
9 The EU’s objectives related to human rights are outlined in the
Commission communication on “Building a Strategic Partners-
hip with China.”discussed above. See “Supporting China’s tran-
sition to an open society based on the rule of law and the respect
for human rights,” http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_rela-
tions/china/com_98/com98_b.htm.
DGAP-Analyse  • Februar 2003 21
practical impact and long-term import of varying ap-
proaches on human rights could help to enhance un-
derstanding of U.S. and European perspectives—and
constraints—in these areas, perhaps narrowing diffe-
rences over time.
A more promising area for transatlantic cooperation
is promotion of the rule of law—an area in which the
EU has been particularly active. Although disparate
traditions and systems of law could pose obstacles to
cooperation, in fact, many legal principles are held in
common, and the United States and Europe are com-
mitted to seeing that the rule of law becomes more
firmly established in China. Exchanges on the relative
success or failure of alternative approaches and pro-
grams could enhance the effectiveness of U.S. and Eu-
ropean initiatives or even lead to the development of
joint initiatives.For example, the United States and Eu-
rope could work together to ensure that EU and U.S.
companies adhere to certain labor standards with re-
gard to Chinese subcontractors or assist jointly in the
training of judges.
An additional topic for intensified exchange is the
potential for, and consequences of, widespread social,
economic, or political instability in China as it conti-
nues with the wrenching process of transformation.
Mindful of the problems created by the unanticipated
dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990, many
U.S. and European China experts have argued that the
international community and national governments
must be prepared to address the development of severe
instability in China and its broader consequences.
Among other issues, transatlantic discussions might
focus on how the United States,European governments
or the European Union might react to a major destabi-
lizing event in China and what means might be availa-
ble to ameliorate any emergent crisis.
The new transnational agenda 
A final area for potential U.S.-European and even
trilateral cooperation comprises the issues associated
with what has been referred to as the “dark side of glo-
balization,” including terrorism, the spread of
HIV/AIDS and other global issues, such as transnatio-
nal crime, drug and human trafficking, and environ-
mental degradation. These problems affect the United
States, Europe, and China; their mutual cooperation
and that of many other nations will be required to find
effective solutions.10 The response of both China and
Europe to President Bush’s call for cooperation to com-
bat terrorism is an encouraging beginning and could
provide the foundation for expanded dialogue. Initiati-
ves to enhance HIV/AIDS prevention and research
offer significant potential for cooperation as well and
could also be used to facilitate discussions on a broader
set of social issues of importance to both the United
States and Europe, including public accountability and
social conditions in China.11 Global warming and ener-
gy could offer additional topics for discussion, not-
withstanding the evident differences between the U.S
administration and European governments over the
Kyoto Protocol. Intensified exchanges on this new,
transnational agenda could provide a “win-win”situa-
tion for all concerned and help to ameliorate Chinese
concerns that the United States and Europe are “collu-
ding” to China’s detriment. As with other issues, the
framework for transatlantic dialogue should be deter-
mined by the specific problem and the capacities of va-
rious bilateral and multilateral fora and mechanisms.
10 On the need for international cooperation on a new transnatio-
nal agenda, see the comments by Ambassador Richard N. Haass,
Director of the Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State,
to the Center for European Reform,“Charting a New Course in
the Transnational Relationship,” 10 June 2002, London,
http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/10968pf.htm.
11 A recent U.S. initiative will include training programs, the ex-
change of scientists and experts, the development of new inter-
vention strategies to prevent HIV transmission, and assistance
to local governments. See U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, “Secretary Thompson Announces Expanded
Cooperation of HIV/AID Programs in China,” 28 June 2003,
available on line at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020628b.html.For
a discussion of HIV/AIDS in China, see Bates Gill, Jennifer
Chang, and Sarah Palmer,“China’s HIV Crisis,” Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2002.
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Obstacles to Cooperation 
The United States and Europe will face multiple
challenges in expanding the transatlantic agenda to in-
clude China and key issues related to its ascendance to a
position of greater prominence in regional and global
affairs. The obstacles to effective cooperation include
political divisions in the United States and the EU;
asymmetries of focus and expertise; bureaucratic bar-
riers; and growing tensions and frictions between the
United States and Europe on non-China related issues.
Divisions and Disunity 
The U.S. polity and both major political parties are
deeply divided over the direction of China policy. Mo-
tivated by strongly-felt ideological, religious, or ethical
concerns, a small, but vocal minority is sharply critical
of U.S. engagement of China. The much larger, unre-
solved debate concerns the implications of China’s ri-
sing power for U.S. interests and engagement in Asia.
Most U.S. China experts believe that the United States
has no choice but to continue with a policy of engage-
ment in some form while pressing for change in critical
areas; others see the possibility of a fundamental shift
in U.S. policy toward a strategy of confrontation and
containment, a development that that would signifi-
cantly complicate cooperation with Europe with re-
gard to China. However minimal or great the danger of
such a shift, public divisions within the U.S. polity in-
tensify European concerns about the perceived volatili-
ty of U.S. policy and make it difficult for European go-
vernments to discern between pronouncements and
actions by the U.S.administration that may be directed
toward winning favor with particular factions in the
broader China policy debate and those that are directed
toward Beijing. The task is all the more challenging be-
cause of the cross-cutting divisions in the U.S. polity,
which exist not only between but within the legislative
and executive branches of government. In the U.S.
Congress, the splits over China policy run through the
major political parties as well as across the aisle. Execu-
tive branch departments and agencies involved with
China policy are similarly divided.
Disunity within Europe can be equally confounding
for the United States. Although the EU member states
have agreed on a joint approach to China, the European
Union’s “Common Foreign and Security Policy” is still
very much a work in progress. The member states re-
main a strong driving force on matters of foreign and
security policy, and the balance of influence between
the EU and member states is still much contested. Alt-
hough the consensus in support of a coordinated ap-
proach to China appears relatively solid—perhaps with
the exception of human rights—compared with EU
strategies on other issues and regions,“Europe” conti-
nues to speak with many voices. Even when the EU
member states can agree on a common policy or ap-
proach, cooperation with third states can be difficult.
The need to preserve unity among the fifteen member
states makes it difficult for the EU to adjust to new cir-
cumstances in bilateral or multilateral discussions.The
United States thus faces the challenge of dealing with a
Europe that is both too united and not united enough.
U.S.-European Asymmetry
U.S.-European cooperation on China will also be
difficult because of an imbalance in focus, interest, and
expertise. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-
tacks on the United States, the Bush administration and
U.S. policymakers have directed considerable energy,
attention and resources toward combating global ter-
rorism, as well as ameliorating continuing crises in the
Middle East and South Asia.While some European go-
vernments have provided significant political, econo-
mic,and military support for the U.S.-led war on terro-
rism, a year after the attacks, many European govern-
ments appear to be refocusing their attention on
completion of the ambitious European agenda, which
they view as critical to the future stability and prosperi-
ty of Europe and a prerequisite to a constructive and in-
fluential role in global affairs. Differing U.S. and Euro-
pean priorities, coupled with Europe’s relatively limi-
ted involvement in Asia, could make it difficult to
expand the transatlantic agenda to include regular dis-
cussion of China’s future evolution and role in East Asia
and global affairs or to move beyond discussion to me-
aningful cooperation. These asymmetries of focus in
turn help to create and sustain a commonly shared per-
ception on both sides of the Atlantic that Europe—
aside from questions of trade and finance—has relati-
vely little to contribute in shaping the future of China
and Asia. Finally, even if European governments can be
persuaded to focus their attention and interest on
“over-the-horizon” issues, governmental and non-go-
vernmental expertise on China and Asia is relatively
thin in contrast to the United States.
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Bureaucratic Barriers
The structure of governmental bureaucracies and
policymaking bodies creates additional obstacles to an
intensified U.S.-European exchange on China. For the
most part, official transatlantic exchanges remain the
responsibility of U.S. European specialists and their
European counterparts responsible for relations with
the United States, both of whom may have limited
knowledge of Asia and China. U.S. or European go-
vernmental experts who specialize in East Asian affairs
have fewer opportunities for regular and meaningful
exchanges with their counterparts across the Atlantic.
U.S. experts’ knowledge of European policies or pro-
grams related to China, or of the dual roles of the EU
and its member states in shaping European approaches
to China, may also be limited. Bi-annual U.S.-EU bila-
teral consultations on Asia are viewed by some obser-
vers as too sporadic and scripted to build a deeper un-
derstanding of either side’s perspective or thinking.12
U.S.-European Frictions 
The most significant obstacle to enhanced U.S.-
European cooperation on China could be escalating
tensions in transatlantic relations and a growing per-
ception in the United States and Europe that the
transatlantic partnership has become less necessary
and more troubled in a changed and changing world.
The negative rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic is
intensifying, with some commentators questioning
the future of the transatlantic partnership. Europe-
ans complain about American unilateralism and
what they see as an arrogant and self-serving notion
of national interest that leaves little room for accom-
modation of allied interests and concerns. Many are
distrustful of American policies and approaches and
increasingly concerned that tactical differences are
becoming differences of philosophy and principle.
Some are also worried about being dragged into con-
flicts over in the Middle East or other regions for the
wrong reasons or due to misguided U.S. policies. U.S.
officials, for their part, criticize the Europeans for in-
sufficient investment in defense capabilities that ren-
ders Europe incapable of being a true partner in mili-
tary operations outside of Europe, while other com-
mentators discern a lack of strategic vision and level
charges of European fecklessness and self-absorp-
tion.13
Although U.S. specialists in European affairs differ
over the degree and severity of the current tensions in
transatlantic relations, many express concern about
growing mutual disaffection and the diffusion of
mutually negative perceptions on both sides of the
Atlantic. While the current spate of tensions may
prove a passing phase, the possibility of a serious rift
in U.S.-European relations should not be excluded.
At the very least, U.S. and European relations could
well remain fractious for the foreseeable future. Alt-
hough the United States and Europe could continue
to cooperate closely in the global war against terro-
rism, developments in Iraq, Iran, or in the Middle
East could cause a severe rupture in U.S.-European
relations, undermining their ability to manage diffe-
rences on other vital issues in the future. Even short
of a fundamental rift in the U.S.-European relations-
hip, it could be very difficult to agree on compatible
or even complementary policies on China in the face
of festering disputes on other fronts.
12 For further discussion of bureaucratic impediments, see David
Shambaugh, “European and American Approaches to China:
Different Beds, Same Dreams?” Sigur Center Asia Papers Num-
ber 15 (Washington,DC: Sigur Center for Asian Studies,2002),6.
13 For a sampling of the escalating rhetoric and diversity of views
on the future of U.S.-European relations, see Ivo Daalder and
Philip Gordon,“Euro-Trashing,”Washington Post, 29 May 2002;
Robert Kagan, “The U.S.-Europe Divide,” Washington Post, 26
May 2002; Jeffrey Gedmin, “The Alliance is Doomer,” Washing-
ton Post, 20 May 2002; Todd S. Purdum,“Powell Encounters Pa-
rallel Universe of Europe,” New York Times, 16 May 2002; Roy
Denham, “Europeans Should Stop Whining and Pull Their
Weight,” International Herald Tribune, 23 May 2002; and Wolf-
gang Ischinger, “What Continental Drift,” The Washington
Times, 23 May 2002. Relations continue to sour in fall 2002 and
early 2003, as differences over Iraq policy intensified.
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Recommendations for Action
Both U.S. and European interests are ill served by a
continuation of the current climate of mutual recrimi-
nations and accusations. If the rhetoric on both sides of
the Atlantic continues to escalate, valuable opportuni-
ties to manage and resolve shared problems, domestic
and foreign, will be lost. In confronting growing trans-
national challenges and dangers, little can be accom-
plished unless the United States and Europe work to-
gether,not only in coordinating their bilateral relations
with China, but in the multilateral fora that will be in-
volved in managing China’s increasing integration and
involvement in regional and global affairs.These inclu-
de not only the World Trade Organization,but the Uni-
ted Nations, the G-8, and the World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund as well.
A broad,sustained,and structured transatlantic dia-
logue on China’s evolution would serve U.S. and Euro-
pean interests and foreign policy goals—both with re-
gard to China and to the transatlantic relationship.
First, transatlantic cooperation is important to effecti-
ve management of the consequences of China’s emer-
gence as a great power. Much of China’s internal deve-
lopment lies far beyond the ability of the United States
or Europe to shape, either alone or in concert. But the
prospect that a rising China will be integrated into the
international community in a peaceful and stabilizing
manner will be much improved if the United States and
Europe pursue mutually reinforcing, rather than com-
bative and incompatible, approaches. Second, effective
co-management of this momentous shift in global po-
litics is also important to the future of the U.S.-Europe-
an partnership.As the United States and Europe evolve
and change, the political will of the United States and
Europe to cooperate will depend increasingly on whet-
her the partnership proves efficacious in tackling a gro-
wing range of new issues and challenges—including
change in China.
To accomplish their joint goals, the United States
and Europe first must expand their vision of the trans-
atlantic partnership. U.S. officials and experts who are
unaccustomed to considering the role of Europe in
their respective areas of geographic or functional ex-
pertise will have to acknowledge the risks of an overly
myopic view as well as the potential benefits of exchan-
ge and dialogue with Europe. This expanded vision of
the transatlantic partnership must include an enhan-
ced role for U.S.-EU coordination.Although the Euro-
pean member states remain the decisive players in mat-
ters of foreign policy, a more coherent and unified Eu-
ropean policy on China is desirable and should be en-
couraged. European and EU officials in turn will need
to look outward, beyond the agenda of European inte-
gration, if the EU is to fulfill its aspirations to play a
more important role in international affairs.Both part-
ners must acknowledge that the transatlantic partners-
hip remains essential and take further steps to expand
the agenda of cooperation to tackle the most important
challenges of the “post-post-Cold War world”—most
of which will lie far beyond Europe’s borders.
Principles of Engagement
An expanded transatlantic dialogue on China and rela-
ted developments in East Asia should be guided by
the following principles:
1. Focus on concrete issues and real experiences.
Agreement on a unified “strategic perspective” re-
garding China—whether within the United States,
in Europe,or between the U.S.and Europe—is likely
to be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve and could
quickly diminish enthusiasm for U.S.-European
cooperation on China.As noted above, the U.S.poli-
ty is divided in its strategic view of Asia and China.
Europeans are also far from achieving a coherent
China policy.Both factors could complicate bilateral
discussions of “strategic perspectives” on China.
The lack of a shared “strategic perspective”on China,
however, need not preclude exchange and coopera-
tion on concrete experiences and issues, which over
time could help to narrow differences of strategic
perspective.
2. Begin with modest expectations. Expansion of the
transatlantic dialogue to include China and East Asia
will be met with much skepticism and even resi-
stance—particularly at a time of “agenda overload”
on both sides of the Atlantic.Barriers to cooperation
can be formidable and differences over specific poli-
cies deeply rooted, impeding ambitious forms of
cooperation. Initially, the dialogue therefore should
pursue modest aims, including enhanced sharing of
information and analyses among non-governmen-
tal and governmental experts, a better understan-
ding of the factors and processes shaping policy on
both sides of the Atlantic, and the creation of stron-
ger, denser network of China and transatlantic ex-
perts in the United States and Europe. If sustained
over time, this focused and differentiated transatlan-
tic dialogue on China could help to achieve greater
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complementarity of action or even, on some issues,
coordinated policies.
3. Pursue a dual-track approach. The institutional fra-
mework of the transatlantic relationship must conti-
nue to evolve.Bilateral exchanges will continue to play
a central role in transatlantic exchanges on China,
particularly on the difficult political and military is-
sues for which national governments remain respon-
sible. Where the EU is assuming more responsibility,
existing U.S.-EU mechanisms for cooperation should
be enhanced and expanded. Steps have been taken in
recent years to ensure that U.S.-EU exchanges are fo-
cused and oriented toward producing concrete re-
sults. In particular, since 1995 the NTA structure has
evolved to include exchanges on defined priority is-
sues at the U.S.-EU summits and meetings of the
NTA’s Senior Level Coordinating Group, which is re-
sponsible for preparing the summits and overseeing
implementation of agreed measures and actions.This
trend must be continued if the U.S.-EU partnership is
truly to be upgraded “from one of consultation to
joint co-operation.”
An Agenda for Action
Building on these general principles of engagement,
several modest steps should be taken immediately to
begin expanding the transatlantic agenda to encompass
the issues posed by China’s rise and emergence on the
international stage. Nongovernmental organizations
and specialists can play an important role in initiating
this process, which over time could help to ensure that
the key issues related to China become a routine matter
of discussion in bilateral and U.S.-EU exchanges. The
agenda for action encompasses three elements:
1. Enhance and expand exchanges among U.S. and Eu-
ropean nongovernmental experts on China,East Asia,
and transatlantic relations.
Progress toward the articulation of an expanded
transatlantic agenda or,alternatively,consideration of
the transatlantic dimension on China policy in inter-
nal deliberations in the United States or Europe, will
require difficult attitudinal and structural changes.
Nongovernmental organizations and specialists can
provide impetus for this transformation process by
raising awareness of the need for change on both sides
of the Atlantic as well as the existence of common
goals or potential problems with regard to the PRC
and Taiwan.Transatlantic exchanges such as the Stim-
son/DGAP effort,or parallel initiatives undertaken by
the George Washington University, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, and other orga-
nizations in the United States and Europe should be
continued and expanded.14 Other prominent nongo-
vernmental organizations in the China field, such as
the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations,
could be valuable partners in an expanding and dee-
pening a  “track two”transatlantic dialogue on China
as well. To enhance the values of these exchanges, se-
veral modest steps should be taken:
– Create a comprehensive inventory of China exper-
tise, both individual and institutional, in Europe
and the United States. This is particularly impor-
tant for many U.S. China experts, who may be less
familiar with their European counterparts than
vice versa. Such an inventory could also help to
strengthen and expand existing networks and ex-
changes across the Atlantic, so that dialogue beco-
mes sustained and focused, rather than episodic
and general.
– Create a catalogue of specific, concrete issues and
urgent problems of common interest to Europe
and the United States. Experts should be asked to
identify key issues for discussion by U.S.and Euro-
pean analysts. This report has identified five broad
policy areas related to China’s evolution and reflec-
ting U.S.and European priorities and interests.The
next step is to single out specific issues for focused
exchange. Problems that might lend themselves to
initial discussion include: HIV/AIDS, global envi-
ronmental issues, energy security, migration, the
transfer of manufacturing and R&D capability to
China,and alternative crisis scenarios in China.
– Enhance existing electronic links between U.S.and
European China experts. Several email list-serves
and Internet exchanges already link U.S.and Euro-
pean experts and institutions. These are generally
less active, however, than many comparable Inter-
14 These efforts include collaboration between the China Policy
Program of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The Ge-
orge Washington University with various institutions in France,
Germany, and the UK, as well as a conference organized by the
Europe Program of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington, DC. See Shambaugh, “European and
American Approaches to China: Different Beds,Same Dreams?”;
and Simon Serfaty, ed., U.S.-German Bilateral Dialogue on
China: Conference Report,Europe Program,Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 2002. This
list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather illustrative, of some
of the initiatives undertaken in recent years to facilitate transat-
lantic exchanges on Asia and China.
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net dialogues in the United States that link functio-
nal or geographic experts. To build a real commu-
nity of expertise, the “virtual” infrastructure must
be strengthened to facilitate the regular exchange
of information,papers,and analyses.Partner insti-
tutions in the United States and Europe should as-
sume responsibility for managing, moderating,
and pulsing discussions and exchanges.
2. Expand bilateral and U.S.-EU governmental exchan-
ges to include specialists in China and East Asia.
The agenda for bilateral meetings as well as U.S.-EU
exchanges should include China as a regular topic of
discussion,rather than a periodic focus when pressing
issues arise or a crisis threatens. To achieve this aim,
bureaucratic and procedural impediments to the in-
clusion of other functional or geographic experts in
transatlantic exchanges must be eliminated on both
sides of the Atlantic. In practice, bilateral exchanges
will be most meaningful with the larger European
countries that, by virtue of their size, economic inter-
ests,political weight in Europe,and major multilateral
roles, e.g., in the G-8 or UN Security Council, play a
larger role in shaping broader policy toward China and
possess greater expertise on China and Asia.The Euro-
pean Commission’s External Relations Directorate
General or the office of the EU’s High Representative
for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
should be engaged,as appropriate,as well as other bo-
dies of the European Union, depending on the issues
involved. To start this process, several steps should be
taken immediately:
– Include government analysts of China and transat-
lantic affairs in a regular exchange on their respecti-
ve assessments of trends and developments related
to China and their implications for transatlantic re-
lations. Given the great uncertainties regarding
China’s evolution,such meetings could help to elu-
cidate the assumptions that may inform policy or
condition policy responses.
– Initiate regular exchanges on China between the re-
search institutes associated with national defense
universities in Europe and the United States. Such
exchanges could be particularly valuable in explo-
ring alternative assessments of critical political and
security issues related to China and in East Asia.
3. Undertake analyses of concrete issues that are on the
horizon and likely to prove contentious.
Intensified inter-governmental, U.S.-EU, and “track
two” exchanges on China should seek to identify the
“over-the-horizon”issues on which U.S.and European
approaches and thinking appear likely to diverge.Such
issues could entail significant risk of a “strategic sur-
prise” in transatlantic relations and/or the emergence
of a split in U.S. and European policies that could be
exploited—to the mutual disadvantage of both trans-
atlantic partners. Three issues merit more extensive
analysis in the near-term:
– Manufacturing/R&D in China. The migration of
manufacturing capacity to China will place subsidi-
aries of U.S. and European firms in competition
with each other within China and under Chinese
rules and regulations.This development could raise
a panoply of economic, political and security pro-
blems to which the Untied States and Europe may
respond differently.
– WTO Implementation.WTO implementation and
improved market access for U.S. and European
firms,especially in the areas of services, are likely to
be of strong interest to both the United States and
Europe.
– Crisis scenarios. Unforeseen and widespread insta-
bility in China could have serious regional and glo-
bal repercussions.Discussion of U.S.and European
responses before a major destabilizing event should
be a high priority for analysis and discussion across
the Atlantic.
For the foreseeable future,the transatlantic agenda will
be dominated by the war against terrorism,the uncertain
situation in Iraq, and conflicts in the Middle East and
South Asia.Yet, while China at present offers no compa-
rable flashpoints, the potential for conflict in the region
and for transatlantic disputes over issues related to China
remains. The U.S. and EU would therefore both benefit
from efforts to enhance mutual understanding of their
respective perspectives on China and to anticipate poten-
tial problems and even crises before they arise.
Though modest in scope and ambition, the steps out-
lined above could help to begin transforming the struc-
ture and content of the transatlantic dialogue to meet the
most important challenges of the coming decades. In the
final analysis,however,the precise form of cooperation is
less important than the existence of political will on both
sides of the Atlantic to manage the complex and myriad
challenges of a rapidly changing world.
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